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THE DEBTOR IN FULL CONTROL: A
CASE FOR ADOPTION OF THE
TRUSTEE SYSTEM
JEROME R. KERKMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Controversy surrounding bankruptcy legislation is not a
new phenomenon. Since Congress first discussed national
bankruptcy legislation which would benefit debtors, "furious
debates"' have taken place. Opposition to legislation intro-
duced in 1840 argued that such a law creates "a general jubi-
lee for debtors, . . . a novel, untried experiment,... [which]
holds out a temptation to every debtor to push his specula-
tions to the brink of rashness and recklessness, by affording
him a sure refuge in case of wreck, at the sole hazard of the
creditor."' 2 The bill passed ten years after its introduction and
was characterized as "'one of the most flagrant laws ever
* Associate, Cook & Franke, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin; J.D., University of Wis-
consin, 1984; B.A., Lawrence University, 1979. The author wishes to express his appre-
ciation to the bankruptcy judges and attorneys of the Eastern District of Wisconsin for
the information and ideas contributed, to the bankruptcy clerks for their assistance, and
to Professors Lynn M. LoPucki and William Whitford of the University of Wisconsin
who reviewed the early drafts of this article.
Carl E. Horn, Statistical Consulting, Computing Services Division, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, selected and performed the statistical tests used in this study.
These tests were completed using Release 9.0 of the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS) and assessed through the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Comput-
ing Services Division. Documentation and additional references concerning tests are
available from SPSS, Inc., 444 North Michigan Ave., Suite 3000, Chicago, Illinois,
60611.
1. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 60-61 (1935).
2. Id.
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passed [by] a Congress.'" The 1978 reform of the bank-
ruptcy laws was similarly attacked with charges that it was a
complete failure.4
Recently, various studies5 have gathered empirical data to
determine the validity of this criticism. This article is a study
which continues to build on the earlier studies. It examines
the effect of Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code6 during
the third year7 after its enactment in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin. It expands on a study entitled "The Debtor in
Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code?' 8 conducted in the Western District of
Missouri during the first year in which the Code was effective9
(Kansas City study). Both the Kansas City study and this
study (Milwaukee study) compiled empirical data taken from
court files and interviews.
This study also utilizes the findings of two other studies to
analyze the data found in Kansas City and Milwaukee. The
Stanley & Girth study,"° published in 1971, examined cases
closed in the fiscal year 1964. It provided a comprehensive
review of bankruptcy under the Act"1 and suggested major re-
visions12 which were, in part, incorporated into the new
Code.13 The second study, the U.S. trustee study,14 evaluated
3. Id. at 80 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong. 2d Sess. 144 (1841) (statement of
President Calhoun)).
4. P. NELSON, CORPORATIONS IN CRISIS: BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS FOR
BANKRUPTCY POLICY (1981); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 953 (1981); Moller, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code or Whatever Hap-
pened to Good-Old Chapter XI?, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 437, 447 (1979).
5. See infra notes 8, 10 & 14.
6. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code is the common name for the bill, designated Pub. L.
No. 95-598, signed by President Carter on November 6, 1978. Chapter 11 refers to
debtor reorganization found in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1100 - 1174 (1982) [hereinafter Code].
7. January 1, 1982, until December 31, 1982.
8. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code? (pts. I & 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247
(1983).
9. October 1, 1979, until October 1, 1980.
10. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 109
(1971).
11. The "Act" generally refers to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its subsequent
amendments up until the enactment of the Code in 1978.
12. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 10, at 197-218.
13. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, PART 1, H.R. DOC. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1973) [hereinafter COM-
MISSION REPORT].
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a four-and-one-half year experiment in which U.S. trustees15
were appointed to selected districts. 16 It sampled cases from
the districts which had U.S. trustees (pilot districts) and dis-
tricts without U.S. trustees (non-pilot districts) for the year
ending June 30, 198 1.17 From the data of all the studies, this
study examines the ability of the 1978 changes in the bank-
ruptcy laws to meet objectives underlying bankruptcy
reorganization.
Congress envisioned the objectives of Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation to allow a debtor, usually a business, 18 "to restructure a
business' finances so that it may continue to operate, provide
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a re-
turn for its stockholders."' 19 The premise underlying Chapter
11 reorganization is that the assets of a business are more val-
uable if they are used in the industry for which they are
designed rather than liquidated.2 ° Creditors, employees and
equity holders all benefit by allowing the business to operate
and reorganize. 21 The end result sought in a reorganization is
a confirmed plan and a profitable business.22
Not all businesses, however, can be reorganized.23 Those
businesses unable to reorganize will eventually be liquidated
for the benefit of creditors.24 In non-pilot districts the Code
14. N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, AN EVALUATION OF THE U.S.
TRUSTEE PILOT PROGRAM FOR BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION (1983).
15. The U.S. trustee was a new administrative mechanism to perform the adminis-
trative functions performed under the Act by the bankruptcy judge. See id. at 21-25; see
also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-151163 (1982).
16. Those districts included Northern Alabama, Central California, Colorado, Del-
aware, District of Columbia, Northern Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Southern New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota and Eastern Virginia. 28 U.S.C. § 581(a)(1982).
17. Id.
18. Of the 18,821 Chapter 11 bankruptcies filed in 1982, 16,622 were business
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS, A-62, A-64, A-66 (for the 12-month pe-
riod ending December 31, 1982) [hereinafter WORKLOAD STATISTICS].
19. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 221.
23. The findings in both Kansas City and Milwaukee point out that only about
24% to 26% of the businesses will actually be reorganized and succeed. See infra notes
53 & 54.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1982), which provides that whether a case should be
converted depends, in part, upon whether it "is in the best interests of creditors." See
1987]
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theoretically places the burden of identifying such businesses
on the creditors and the debtor." Creditors in non-pilot dis-
tricts are also primarily responsible for monitoring the day-to-
day operations of the debtor.26 In pilot districts this responsi-
bility lies jointly with creditors and the U.S. trustee.27
This theoretical delegation of responsibility to creditors in
the non-pilot districts represents a significant departure from
the pre-Code bankruptcy law in which bankruptcy judges
were actively involved in administering cases.28 Under the
Code, bankruptcy judges supposedly only become involved if
a justiciable dispute arises. In order to meet the enlarged
creditor responsibility, the Code provides creditors with vari-
ous tools to protect their interests, to prevent debtors from
abusing the bankruptcy process, and to insure that debtors
timely reorganize their businesses.2 9
also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1978); H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 405 (1977).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982), provides that "[t]he debtor may convert a case under
this chapter to a case under chapter 7," and that the court may convert the case "on
request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing." The court does not have
the power to convert on its own motion. J. TROST, G. TREISTER, L. FORMAN, K.
KLEE & R. LEVIN, RESOURCE MATERIALS: THE NEW FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE
265 (1979). However, there is authority to the contrary, and the bankruptcy courts are
split on whether the Code permits the court to monitor and administrate reorganization
cases. See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 249 n.83.
26. N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, supra note 14, at 63.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (1982), provides: "(a) Each United States trustee, within
his district, shall ... supervise the administration of cases and trustees in cases under
chapter 7, 11, or 13 of title 11 .. "
28. "The court is removed from any obligation to oversee or otherwise be con-
cerned about the operation of that business. That is the function of the creditors' com-
mittee, the United States trustee and the creditors themselves." Moller, supra note 4, at
447; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 93-94; J. TROST, G. TRIESTER, L.
FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, supra note 25, at 7-11; Kennedy, The Bankruptcy
Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its Structure and Jurisdiction, 55 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 63, 63-65 (1981).
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1982) which allows a creditor to move to convert a
case under Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 if there is an absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation, the debtor is unable to effectuate a plan, or if there is an unreasonable
delay that is prejudicial to creditors. The court must convert the case if it is in the best
interest of the creditors and the estate. Section 1104 allows a creditor to move for the
appointment of a trustee or an examiner; Section 1103 allows the creditors' committee
to hire attorneys, accountants or other agents to perform services for it; Section 1121(c)
allows creditors to file a plan of reorganization after the exclusive period for the debtor
elapses.
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The Kansas City study found that a lack of creditor par-
ticipation in Chapter 11 proceedings had caused a systems
failure in the Western District of Missouri.30 Debtors31 oper-
ated their businesses as long as current expenses could be met.
Creditors could not force the debtors to end their businesses.
The Kansas City study concluded the debtors were in Pall con-
trol of the reorganization proceedings. This study tests that
conclusion by comparing the data from Milwaukee with the
findings of the Kansas City study and other studies.
In gathering the data, every attempt was made to dupli-
cate the methodology and classifications used in Kansas City.
Data was collected by going through court files in January
and February of 1984. Unlike the Kansas City study, not
every case filed was studied. There were 152 cases filed under
Chapter 11 during the 1982 calendar year in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin;32 forty-eight cases 33 were examined. This
represents 37% of the cases filed in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin and 0.3% of Chapter 11 cases filed in all the dis-
tricts for 1982. 34 The first four cases filed in each month were
used in order to avoid seasonal bias. Attorneys, judges, and
estate administrators were interviewed where supplemental in-
formation was necessary. A follow-up examination of each
file was conducted in March, 1985.
The findings in the Eastern District of Wisconsin may be
representative of many districts. At the time of this study, the
district included the City of Milwaukee, which ranks eight-
eenth and Milwaukee's metropolitan area, which ranks
twenty-seventh in population in the United States. 35 The city
had the tenth largest volume of industrial production with the
30. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 103.
31. Throughout this study "debtor" is used to mean both a debtor-in-possession
and the business itself.
32. WORKLOAD STATISTIcs, supra note 18, at A-63, A-65.
33. Fifty-seven cases were actually examined. Like the Kansas City study, cases
which were jointly administered or were substantively related were treated as one.
Also, involuntary petitions were usually followed by a subsequent voluntary petition.
These cases were treated as one case. See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 101-02 n.7.
34. Fifty-seven filings in Wisconsin were examined. The total number of Chapter
I 1 filings in the country was 18,821. See WORKLOAD STATISTIcs, supra note 18, at A-
62, A-64.
35. Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF
FAcTs 1982, at 664 (1982).
1987]
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fourth largest auto making center in the United States.36 In
contrast with the Milwaukee Metropolitan Area, the district
also included farming counties and smaller communities and
cities.
Table 1 shows the types of businesses which filed under
Chapter 11 in the various districts studied in the Milwaukee,
Kansas City, Stanley & Girth and U.S. trustee studies. The
apportionment among the types of businesses filing in the vari-
ous districts appears to be similar.37
36. Id.
37. The types of businesses filing in Milwaukee and Kansas City were similar to a
statistically significant degree. In comparing the types of businesses in Kansas City and
Milwaukee, the following null hypothesis was accepted at a level of significance equal to
0.2838 using the chi-squared test of homogeneity:
H: The distribution between Milwaukee and Kansas City is the same.
A: There is a difference in the distribution between Milwaukee and Kansas
City.
There was found to be a statistically significant variance in the types of businesses
between all of the studies. A statistical test was performed to determine whether a
difference existed in proportion to the various types of businesses in Milwaukee, Kansas
City, the pilot and non-pilot districts. The following null hypothesis was rejected in
favor of the alternative hypothesis that there was a difference at a level of significance of
0.0 127 using the chi-squared test of homogeneity:
H: The distribution is the same for all districts.
A: The distribution varies between the districts.
The distribution in the Stanley & Girth study was excluded because actual numbers for
the percentages could not be determined.
[Vol. 70:159
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TABLE 1
TYPES OF BUSINESSES
Description XP38  K.C.39 Milw.4  Pilot41 Non-Pilot
Manufacturing 40% 30% 22% 20% 11%
Services 20% 8% 20% 27% 29%
Retail Trade 19% 24%* 18% 20% 22%
Wholesale Trade 10% 6%* 4% 0% 0%
Agriculture 5% 6% 8% 4% 4%
Construction 2% 6% 10%* 7% 9%
Real Estate 2% 4% 10%* 11% 11%
Transportation 1% 8% 0% 5% 6%
Finance 1% 0% 0% 3% 5%
Warehousing 0% 2% 0% 0% 0%
Unclassified 0% 4% 6% 3% 3%
100% 98%** 98%** 100% 100%
* One business in each study was classified under two
categories and was therefore counted twice.
** Percentages were rounded off and therefore do not add up
to 100%.
This article analyzes the findings of the Milwaukee study
in three parts. The first part compares the findings in
Milwaukee with those relied upon by the Kansas City study to
determine whether the debtor was in full control. The second
part investigates the reasons for debtor control by examining
six mechanisms provided in the Code to control debtors. The
third part suggests that the solution to the problem of debtor
control is the adoption of the U.S. trustee system.
II. DEBTOR CONTROL
The Kansas City study concluded that "the debtors stud-
ied were able to continue in complete control of their busi-
nesses while they were under the jurisdiction of the court.
With the.., exception of secured and priority creditors' abil-
ity to negotiate their own treatment under a plan, creditors
38. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 10, at 109.
39. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 118-19, 122-23.
40. See infra APPENDIX, Charts I & III.
41. N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, supra note 14, at 48.
1987]
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were effectively excluded from the process of
reorganization. '42
That study relied upon three findings to support its con-
clusion. First, creditors could not close nonviable businesses
as long as the debtor could pay current operating expenses.43
Second, creditors could not force a change in management
even though poor management was widely believed to be the
cause of most businesses' failures.' Third, unsecured credi-
tors lacked the power to meaningfully negotiate their own
treatment under the plans.45 One additional finding support-
ing the conclusion is the debtors' ability to use the Chapter 11
proceedings to delay payments to creditors.
This section will compare the findings in Milwaukee in
these four areas with those in Kansas City to determine the
extent to which the conclusion from the Kansas City study is
applicable to Milwaukee.
A. Creditor Inability to Promptly Close Nonviable
Businesses
Creditors in an open credit economy often have an inter-
est in promptly closing nonviable46 businesses. Creditors have
sometimes been required to wait for eighteen months or
more47 before the debtor files under Chapter 11. If acting in
their own best interests, creditors should want to receive
prompt payment to minimize the time-loss value48 of their
42. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 272.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 264-65, 272.
45. Id. at 272.
46. A business is nonviable when its immediate liquidation value exceeds the pres-
ent value of the future excess of revenue over expenses other than interest on debt al-
ready incurred and depreciation on assets already owned. LoPucki, A General Theory
of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 325-
27 (1982); see also Bulow & Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELL J. ECON. 437,
442 (1978). Thus, profitability alone does not determine whether a business is viable.
Viability depends on the present value of the continuation of the business being greater
than the immediate liquidation value.
47. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 261-62.
48. The loss in the time value of money refers to the difference between the value of
a claim if it is paid immediately and the value of that same claim if it is received at a
later date. Even without inflation, the use of money has value. See W. KLEIN, BusI-
NESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 201 (1980).
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money, to insure that assets are not dissipated,4 9 and to re-
ceive the maximum liquidation value of the business. Credi-
tors willingly wait longer to receive payment rather than seek
immediate liquidation of the business because of the possibil-
ity that continued operation of the business will yield greater
payment. If a business cannot be reorganized and is non-
viable, the creditors should demand the prompt liquidation of
the business 50 in order to minimize their losses.
Sometimes unsecured creditors have no interest in liqui-
dating a business regardless of its viability. If, as is often the
case, liquidation of the business would yield nothing for un-
secured creditors, their only hope of payment is the continued
operation of the business. Also, trade creditors may continue
to supply the debtor on a C.O.D. basis after the Chapter 11
filing and may not press for liquidation.
Congress recognized creditor interest in liquidating some
businesses by providing that any party in interest, including a
creditor,5' may request the court to convert the case to a
Chapter 7 if the debtor is unable to effectuate a plan, if there is
a continuing loss or diminution of the estate and unreasonable
likelihood of rehabilitation, or if there is unreasonable delay
prejudicial to creditors.5 2 Given the findings in Kansas City
and Milwaukee that 74%53 and 76%, 54 respectively, of the op-
erating businesses entering Chapter 11 proceedings were des-
tined to fail, it would seem likely that creditors might benefit
from identifying many nonviable businesses and forcing their
prompt liquidation.
The Kansas City study found, however, that of the
twenty-four cases closed while under the jurisdiction of the
49. If an unprofitable business continues to operate while under the protection of
the bankruptcy court, assets which may have been available for unsecured creditors at
the time of filing could be dissipated through paying salaries to officers and key person-
nel, liquidating assets (often to insiders), and employing professionals with high fees (as
a cost of administration). N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, supra note 14, at 71.
50. Liquidation of the business can occur through the sale of the business as a going
concern to a third-party.
51. A party in interest includes a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1982).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1982).
53. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 100. The Kansas Citystudy found a 26% overall
success rate.
54. See infra APPENDIX, Chart II. Of the 48 businesses which filed under Chapter
11, about which the outcome is known, 11 were successfully reorganized.
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court, only one (4%) was closed against the wishes of the
debtor. 5  The debtors in Kansas City moved to convert or
dismiss, or proposed a liquidating plan, in eighteen cases. In
the five other cases the court entered the order to convert or
dismiss without objection by the debtors. 6
Of the twenty-seven businesses closed in Milwaukee while
under the jurisdiction of the court, 7 debtors did not consent
to closing the businesses in four cases (15%).58 Fifteen busi-
nesses were closed after the debtors moved to convert or dis-
miss, or after the debtors proposed a liquidating plan.5 9 Eight
55. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 260-61.
56. Id. at 261.
57. See infra APPENDIX, Chart II.
58. Id. A.W. Huss Co., No. 82-00097 (E.D. Wis. filed Jan. 18, 1982); Conservation
Update Publications, Inc., No. 82-03509 (E.D. Wis. filed Oct. 5, 1982); K. & S. Oriental
Food Store, Inc., No. 82-02610 (E.D. Wis. filed Aug. 3, 1982); Norwood Servs., Inc.,
No. 82-02673 (E.D. Wis. filed Aug. 6, 1982).
In A. W. Huss, the creditors successfully ousted the debtor when the court appointed
a trustee over the objection of the debtor. The trustee later liquidated the business
without any opposition from the debtor.
A secured creditor in K. & S. Oriental successfully lifted the stay when the debter
failed to object. The stay was lifted by operation of law. Later, the court refused the
debtor's motion to use its equitable power under § 105 to continue the stay. The debtor
appealed, and the appeal was eventually dismissed for lack of prosecution.
In Conservation Update, the debtor successfully opposed a motion to convert one
month before the case was converted even though its attorney had withdrawn from the
case one month earlier. It is unclear whether the debtor opposed the successful motion
to convert. The Chapter 7 trustee then took over and operated the business. The
trustee investigated the debtor's personal dealings with the business. Later, the debtor's
motion to dismiss the case was denied.
The debtor in Norwood filed a plan three months after filing. The only creditors
involved were taxing authorities. The plan proposed to pay them without interest.
Such a plan cannot be confirmed under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982), which pro-
vides that taxes must be paid either in full or with interest. No confirmable plan was
ever filed and the court, over the objection of the debtor, dismissed the case.
59. Bernard Cos. Ins. Agency, No. 82-03913 (E.D. Wis. filed Nov. 4, 1982); Carpet
Faire, Inc., No. 82-00336 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 11, 1982); Clausing, R. & J., No. 82-
01516 (E.D. Wis. filed May 11, 1982); Doelger & Kirston, Inc., No. 82-01836 (E.D.
Wis. filed June 4, 1982); Dor-Phil, Inc., 82-00283 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 8, 1982); Goelzer
& Schultz Co., No. 82-01162 (E.D. Wis. filed Apr. 19, 1982); Janicki's Men's Wear,
Ltd., No. 82-00630 (E.D. Wis. filed Mar. 5, 1982); K.J. & P.J. Invs. Inc., No. 82-03058
(E.D. Wis. filed Sept. 9, 1982); Kool Bros. Inc., No. 82-04443 (E.D. Wis. filed Dec. 13,
1982); Leister, P., No. 82-03875 (E.D. Wis. filed Nov. 2, 1982); National Control Sys.,
Inc., No. 82-03455 (E.D. Wis. filed Oct. 1, 1982); New Frontier Mfg., Inc., No. 82-
01542 (E.D. Wis. filed May 12, 1982); Rennhack, P. & S., No. 82-01168 (E.D. Wis. filed
Apr. 19, 1982); Rhode, R., No. 82-03012 (E.D. Wis. filed Sept. 3, 1982); Schoeffler
Diamonds, Inc., No. 82-03128 (E.D. Wis. filed Sept. 13, 1982).
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others were closed after the court or creditors moved to con-
vert or dismiss the case without opposition from the debtor.60
Creditors in Milwaukee were able to close three more non-
viable businesses than their Kansas City counterparts. While
this may suggest that Milwaukee creditors had more control
than the Kansas City creditors, there was no statistically sig-
nificant difference in the amount of control.6 1 An examination
of unsecured creditors' efforts in Milwaukee supports the find-
ing in Kansas City of unsecured creditors' general inability to
close nonviable businesses.
Creditors in Milwaukee were initially unsuccessful in at-
tempts to close most of the businesses they identified as non-
viable. Creditors had unsuccessfully moved to dismiss or
convert seven businesses destined to fail.6 Those businesses
continued operating for up to twenty-one months before pay-
ing anything to creditors,63 or up to seven months before being
converted or dismissed with the debtors' consent.r4  Of the
twenty-seven cases in Milwaukee closed while under the juris-
60. Foremost Metal Prods., Inc., No. 82-01860 (E.D. Wis. filed June 7, 1982); Ho-
rizons Int'l, Inc., No. 82-01482 (E.D. Wis. filed May 7, 1982); Koceja, W. & P., No. 82-
00640 (E.D. Wis. filed March 5, 1982); Mattias & Son, Inc., No. 82-03907 (E.D. Wis.
filed Nov. 3, 1982); Metal Parts Corp., No. 82-04439 (E.D. Wis. filed Dec. 13, 1982);
Realty Plus, 82-01794 (E.D. Wis. filed June 1, 1982); Stanley J. Matson & Son, Inc.,
No. 82-00098 (E.D. Wis. filed Jan. 18, 1982).
61. Rather, the ability of both Milwaukee and Kansas City creditors to close non-
viable businesses was found to be the same to a statistically significant degree. Using the
Fisher-Irwin test and Fisher's Exact test, the following null hypothesis was accepted
and the alternative hypothesis rejected:
H: Milwaukee creditors have the same or less ability to close nonviable busi-
nesses as Kansas City creditors.
A: Milwaukee creditors have more ability than Kansas City creditors to close
nonviable businesses.
The null hypothesis was accepted in both tests with an approximate significance level of
0.2100.
62. A. W. Huss, No. 82-00097; Foremost, No. 82-01860; Koceja, No. 82-00640; Re-
alty Constr., Inc., No. 82-00260 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 4, 1982); StanleyJ. Matson & Son,
No. 82-00098.
63. In Norwood Servs., Inc., No. 82-02673 (E.D. Wis. filed Aug. 6, 1982), one
unconfirmable plan was proposed three months after filing. The business was finally
dismissed over the debtor's objection 21 months later. See infra APPENDIX, Chart III.
64. See infra APPENDIX, Chart III. Realty Construction, Inc. was not operating at
the time the motion to convert was filed. Realty Constr., No. 82-00260. A motion to
convert was filed in Metal Parts, No. 82-04439, in June, 1983. Metal Parts Corp. was
converted in January 1984. See infra APPENDIX, Chart III.
1987]
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diction of the court, creditors' initial attempts to close eleven 65
businesses (41%) by moving to convert, dismiss or lift the stay
resulted in seven failures (64%), three successes with the con-
sent of the debtors (27%), and one success without the
debtor's consent (9%).66
Like the cases studied in Kansas City, most of the busi-
nesses were closed only after debtors could not meet operating
expenses. Only then did the debtors in Milwaukee move to
convert or dismiss the cases, or fail to oppose creditors' mo-
tions to convert. Debtors voluntarily closed eleven busi-
nesses 67  (41%) after they could notmeet their ordinary
operating expenses. Debtors voluntarily closed eight other
businesses68 when they were unable to pay taxes, payments
under a confirmed plan, or adequate protection payments69 to
secured creditors ordered by the court in a "doomsday" or-
der.70 The debtors' inability to pay these normal operating ex-
65. A. W. Huss, No. 82-00097; Conservation Update Publications, Inc., No. 82-
03509 (E.D. Wis. filed Oct. 5, 1982); Foremost, No. 82-01860; Horizons Int'l, Inc., No.
82-01482 (E.D. Wis. filed May 7, 1982); Koceja, No. 82-00640; Mattias & Son, Inc., No.
82-03907 (E.D. Wis. filed Nov. 3, 1982); Metal Parts, No. 82-04439; Norwood, No. 82-
02673; Realty Constr., No. 82-00260; Realty Plus, No. 82-01794 (E.D. Wis. filed June 1,
1982); Stanley J. Matson & Son, No. 82-00098.
66. The seven failures were A. W. Huss, No. 82-00097; Conservation Update, No.
82-03509; Foremost No. 82-01860; Horizons Int'l,, No. 82-01482; Koceja, No. 82-00640;
Metal Parts, No. 82-00439; and Realty Constr. No. 82-00260. Of the seven initial fail-
ures three were within three months of the filing date. The other four failures were
between four and eleven months after filing. The three successful motions with the
debtor's consent were Mattias & Son, No. 82-03907; Realty Plus, No. 82-01794; Stanley
J. Matson & Son, No. 82-00098. The one success without the debtor's consent was
Norwood, No. 82-02673.
67. Carpet Faire, Inc., No. 82-00336 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 11, 1982); Clausing, R.
& J., No. 82-01516 (E.D. Wis. filed May 11, 1982); Goelzer & Schultz Co., No. 82-
01162 (E.D. Wis. filed Apr. 19, 1982); Janicki's Men's Wear, Ltd., No. 82-00630 (E.D.
Wis. filed Mar. 5, 1982); K.J. & P.J. Invs., Inc., No. 82-03058 (E.D. Wis. filed Sept. 9,
1982); Kool Bros., Inc., No. 82-04443 (E.D. Wis. filed Dec. 13, 1982); Leister, P., No.
82-03875 (E.D. Wis. filed Nov. 2, 1982); National Control Sys., Inc., No. 82-03455
(E.D. Wis. filed Oct. 1, 1982); New Frontier Mfg., Inc., No. 82-01542 (E.D. Wis. filed
May 12,1982); Rennhack, P. & S., No. 82-01168 (E.D. Wis. filed Apr. 19, 1982);
Rhode, R., No. 82-03012 (E.D. Wis. filed Sept. 3, 1982).
68. Foremost, No. 82-01860; Horizons Int'l, No. 82-01482; Koceja, No. 82-00640;
Mattias & Son, No. 82-03907; Metal Parts, No. 82-04439; Realty Constr., No. 82-00260;
Realty Plus, No. 82-01794; Stanley J. Matson & Son, No. 82-00098.
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1982).
70. As a compromise to motions to lift the stay or convert, the court ordered pay-
ments to secured creditors or tax authorities in the form of a "doomsday" order. A
"doomsday" order provides that if payments are not regularly made, upon the request
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penses71 led the court to enter unopposed orders to convert, or
prompted the debtors to convert on their own. Thus, in
nineteen of the twenty-seven cases (70%), the debtor volunta-
rily closed the business only after the business could not meet
normal operating expenses.
Like the creditors in Kansas City, the creditors studied in
Milwaukee were unable to promptly close businesses identified
as nonviable. Milwaukee creditors were more successful than
Kansas City creditors in closing nonviable businesses, but
70% of the nonviable businesses in Milwaukee continued to
operate as long as debtors could pay current operating ex-
penses. The debtors' ability to meet current operating ex-
penses, rather than the creditors' ability to attack nonviable
businesses, determined when those businesses would be closed
in both Milwaukee and Kansas City.
B. Creditor Ability to Change Management
"There is a broad consensus among students of business
failure that the large majority of businesses which fail do so
because of poor management. ' 72 The Kansas City study con-
cluded from this premise that changes in management would
often be needed to enable a successful reorganization but, in
fact, found that management was rarely ousted.73
Creditors in Milwaukee were only slightly more success-
ful. They ousted management in one case,74 and the debtors
agreed to relinquish control of the businesses with the ap-
pointment of a trustee in three other cases.75 Creditors in Mil-
waukee moved to appoint a trustee in two other cases but
were unsuccessful.76
The creditors' committee in A. W. Huss Co.,77 moved to
appoint a trustee after receiving the examiner's report. The
of the creditor, the court at the time of the default will then grant the relief: either the
lifting of the stay or conversion.
71. Normal operating expenses include adequate protection payments. See infra
notes 154-55.
72. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 263.
73. Id. at 264.
74. A.W. Huss Co., No. 82-00097 (E.D. Wis. filed Jan. 18, 1982).
75. See supra note 58.
76. Those cases were Bernard Cos. Ins. Agency, No. 82-03913 (E.D. Wis. filed
Nov. 4, 1982); Realty Constr., Inc., No. 82-00260 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 4, 1982).
77. No. 82-00097 (E.D. Wis. filed Jan. 18, 1982).
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report revealed that the present owners, husband and wife,
bought the wholesale food business from the wife's father two
and one-half years before filing under Chapter 11. Expenses
in nine categories rose from $894,197 in 1979, to $2,218,727 in
1981, when the new owners modernized and moved the busi-
ness to a new industrial park.78 Shortly after filing, salesmen,
delivery drivers and one office manager quit without notice.79
Sales dropped by fifty percent.80 The corporation had
purchased a home for the new owners and had paid their per-
sonal travel expenses. 81 The business had been profitable
before the new owners took over. Over the objection of the
owners, the court appointed a trustee.
Trustees were appointed in Plunkett, . & M. ,82 4X Corp.83
and Pavek Bros. Farms84 after the current management con-
sented to the appointment. Plunkett involved the failing of a
real estate empire; the debtor was convicted of violating state
security laws. In Plunkett, the debtor moved for the appoint-
ment of a trustee immediately after filing. Attorneys in the
case stated that the debtor felt if he did not voluntarily move
for a trustee, one would nonetheless be appointed. The debtor
apparently recognized his own gross mismanagement.
In 4X Corp., the debtor consented to a trustee after heavy
pressure by the creditors.85 Three families owning companies
78. The following information was taken from the Examiner's Report:
1979 1981
Leasehold Improvements S 553 $ 4,075
Plant Equipment 2,500 146,600
Wages 524,160 884,402
Warehouse Expenses 892 17,083
Utilities 904 46,167
Truck & Auto Investments 300,646 626,286
Truck Expenses 280,307 117,726
Office Equipment 20,880 148,016
Office Supplies 19,913 65,786
TOTAL $894,197 $2,218,727
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. No. 82-01119 (E.D. Wis. filed Apr. 15, 1982).
83. No. 82-04419 (E.D. Wis. filed Dec. 10, 1982).
84. No. 82-02694 (E.D. Wis. filed Aug. 9, 1982).
85. From December 22, 1983, until February 12, 1984, three creditors moved to lift
the stay; two creditors moved to convert to Chapter 7; one moved to limit the use of
cash collateral, and one objected to any further extension of time for the debtor to have
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involved in cement, asphalt and road construction merged to
form the debtor corporation eleven months before the corpo-
ration filed under Chapter 11. The debtor blamed problems
on inefficiency and duplication of administrative expenses and
authority. The debtor continued to lose money during the
Chapter 11 proceedings, and creditors heavily attacked the
continued operation of the business immediately before the
trustee was appointed.8 6 The debtor reached a compromise
with the creditors by consenting to the appointment of a
trustee, and the debtor's operations markedly improved
afterward.87
The creditors' committee moved for the appointment of a
trustee in Pavek Bros. Farms for the limited purpose of finding
a lessee for the farmland. The debtor consented to the ap-
pointment for this purpose. The trustee did not operate the
farm or investigate the operations of the debtor, but merely
insured that rental payments from the land went to the estate.
Two of these three cases were the largest unsuccessful
cases studied.88 As such, it appears that in large asset cases
involving mismanagement, creditors can successfully oust cur-
rent management either forcibly or coercively.
In light of the widely accepted notion that poor manage-
ment is the principal reason for business failures and that un-
secured creditors many times will not be paid if the business
the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization. The trustee was appointed in March,
1984.
86. A review of the annual audit filed in 1985 revealed the following:
1983 1984 1985 (Est.)
Net Sales (x 1,000) $22,251 $22,219 $22,291
Cost of Sales (x 1,000) 22,379 20,686 20,549
Gross Profit (x 1,000) 872 1,533 1,742
Administrative Expenses (x 1,000) 1,378 1,380 1,380
Operating Profit (x 1,000) (506) 153 362
Difference between
Misc. Income and
Misc. Expenses (x 1,000) (2,026) (749) 249
Net Earnings (x 1,000) (2,532) (596) 611
87. A plan of reorganization was eventually confirmed on July 22, 1985. (This has
not been included in Charts II, III or V of the APPENDIX as a "success" case because it
occurred after the statistical tests were run and the paper was virtually completed.
Since the case was pending at the time the statistical tests were conducted, it was ex-
cluded from the data involving "success" cases.).
88. See infra APPENDIX, Chart II.
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
does not succeed, 89 it seems unlikely that only three of the
largest debtors were poorly managed businesses requiring
complete replacement of management. Rather, creditors were
generally unable or unwilling to remove poor management in
other cases even where a strong likelihood existed that failure
of the business meant no payment.
The creditors probably did not remove management due
to the amount of assets, the number of employees and the lack
of knowledge about the business. These factors made the ap-
pointment of a trustee impossible. In some cases, businesses
were so small that sufficient income could not be generated to
support the expense of a trustee. The cost to creditors of im-
posing a trustee might have influenced the decision. Although
the creditors' committee has the right to have its attorney fees
paid by the debtor, 90 the debtor, against whom the right is
enforced, may not have the money to pay these expenses.
The size of the business influenced the decision to appoint
a trustee since many times small businesses could not have
operated without the principal owners. Of the thirty-six91
businesses studied, twenty-six had either one or two owners
(72%).92 The remaining businesses were also closely held.93 If
a business had relatively few assets and was closely held, the
principal owner was usually the manager and principal em-
ployee. Frequently, the owner was the only one who knew the
important information about the business and was not fully
compensated for his time. For example, in Bernard Cos. In-
surance Agency, Inc. , the creditors' committee opposed the
debtor's motion to convert and asked that a trustee be ap-
89. See infra text accompanying note 136.
90. The creditors' committee, with court approval, can employ an attorney at the
expense of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982). See Blaine & Erne, Creditors' Com-
mittees Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition,
Powers and Duties, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 491, 501-03 (1984); DeNatale, The Creditors
Committee Under the Bankruptcy Code - A Primer, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43, 58-62
(1981).
91. Of the 48 cases studied, the number of the principal owners is known in 36
cases.
92. See infra APPENDIX, Chart I.
93. The other businesses had between 3 and 32 owners. The largest ones, National
Control Systems, Inc. and 4X Corp., with 32 and 23 owners, respectively, were family
controlled with some family members owning relatively few shares. Only a handful of
those shareholders ran or controlled the business.
94. No. 82-03913 (E.D. Wis. filed Nov. 4, 1982).
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pointed. The court ruled that a trustee could not be appointed
because the business, an insurance agency, depended upon the
owner's personal contacts and could not operate without the
involvement of the owner.
Creditors had no real opportunity to impose a change in
management by appointing a trustee in cases involving small,
closely held businesses. In those businesses, if the debtor were
ousted, there would have been no management and the busi-
ness would have immediately closed. The needed change of
management never occurred either because the court or the
creditors were unwilling to force a change. As such, the debt-
ors remained in control of the businesses, with no threat of a
loss of control in most cases.
C. Creditor Treatment Under Debtor Proposed Plans
The Kansas City study concluded that "the debtors stud-
ied were successful in dictating the terms of reorganization to
their creditors." 95 Similarly, the findings in Milwaukee show
the debtors dictated the terms of their plans to creditors. 96
1. Liquidating Plans
Five of the twenty-two Milwaukee plans (22%) proposed
to liquidate the assets and pay creditors according to the liqui-
dation priority under the Code.97 Of the five liquidating plans,
only one attempted to sell the business as a going concern;
however, this attempt failed and the assets were individually
auctioned off. The other four plans proposed to sell off the
assets in an orderly liquidation.
Apparently creditors do not object to debtors liquidating
their own businesses. Creditors voted on and confirmed two
liquidation plans.98 Creditors mounted no opposition despite
the proposal in both confirmed plans to pay potentially un-
secured creditors less than they would have received under
Chapter 7. For example, the debtor in Schoeffler
95. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 101.
96. See infra APPENDIX Chart V.
97. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 507 (1982) in which priorities for distribution are set
forth.
98. Dor-Phil, Inc., No. 82-00283 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 8, 1982); Schoeffler
Diamonds, No. 82-03182 (E.D. Wis. filed Sept. 13, 1982).
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Diamonds99 proposed to pay unsecured creditors 60% of the
net sales receipts after payment of priority and secured claims.
Forty percent would be paid to the sole equity holder.
Neither the creditors' committee nor the attorney for the com-
mittee objected. In Dor-Phil, Inc., ° the debtor proposed to
sell the business as a going concern within sixty days of confir-
mation and, if such plan was successful, to pay the owner a
$7,500 bonus. The plan provided that if the debtor could not
sell the business as a going concern, the assets would be liqui-
dated at an auction. The auction took place netting only
$11,000, and the debtor waived any rights to the bonus. No
creditors' committee was involved.
These two cases are unusual in that creditors voluntarily
voted to take less than they might have received in a Chapter
7 liquidation. Under Chapter 7, equity holders would receive
no payment unless all other creditors were paid in full.101
Although creditors elected to receive less than they might
have under Chapter 7, neither equity holder actually received
payment.
2. Operating Plans
The operating plans examined in Milwaukee and Kansas
City were remarkably similar. All the operating plans, except
one, proposed to pay unsecured creditors over time and usu-
ally without interest. The plans ranged from paying 100% to
13.5% over a period of seventeen months to six years. The
Kansas City study found that the operating plans polarized
into two categories, those paying 100% to unsecured credi-
tors, and those paying as little as possible.10 2
That study reasoned that debtors proposed to pay 100%
either for business reputation or moral reasons, or where they
feared losing ownership under the absolute priority rule of
Section 1129(b).10 3 If 100% could not be paid, business repu-
99. No. 82-03128 (E.D. Wis. filed Sept. 13, 1982).
100. No. 82-00283 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 8, 1982).
101. The debtors are listed last in the order of priorities to receive payment. 11
U.S.C. § 726 (1982).
102. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 267.
103. Id. at 261-68. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1982) provides that if all the classes of
creditors do not accept the plan, the debtor may still receive confirmation, but only if
the debtor does not retain any ownership interest.
[Vol. 70:159
TRUSTEE SYSTEM
tation and morality were no longer important so debtors pro-
posed to pay as little as possible. This explained the low
number of plans, three (10%), paying a middle range of 44%
to 99% of the unsecured creditor claims."° That study pre-
dicted that once debtors' attorneys realized the low
probability of the debtors' losing control of the business under
the absolute priority rule of Section 1129(b), debtors would
propose to pay less to unsecured creditors. 105
The plans studied in Milwaukee were consistent 10 6 with
that prediction. As indicated by Table 2 below, almost half 0 7
of the operating Milwaukee plans proposed to pay less than
43% to unsecured creditors.
104. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 267.
105. Id. at 269.
106. The plans were consistent and the percentages paid under the plans were not
different in Milwaukee to a statistically significant degree. Tests were run on each cate-
gory of operating plans. Each test found no statistically significant difference between
the categories. The null hypothesis for each was accepted:
1. H: The proportion of debtors who proposed to pay 100% in Milwaukee is
the same as the proportion who planned to pay 100% in Kansas City.
A: The proportions are not the same.
The hypothesis was accepted with a significant probability level of 0.1156 using the chi-
squared test of homogeneity. The Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.25.
2. H: The proportion of debtors who proposed to pay 75% to 100% is the
same in Milwaukee and Kansas City.
A: The proportion is smaller in Milwaukee than in Kansas City.
The Fisher-Irwin test, a small sample test, yields a significance level of 0.185.
When following the alternative hypothesis substitute, A, the proportion of debtors
who proposed to pay 75% to 99% is not the same in Milwaukee and Kansas City. If
tested using the chi-squared test of homogeneity, the significance level is 0.1518.
3. H: The proportion of debtors who planned to pay 44% to 74% is the same
in Milwaukee and Kansas City.
A: The proportion of debtors who planned to pay 44% to 74% is smaller
in Kansas City than in Milwaukee.
When the Fisher-Irwin test is used the resulting significance probability is 0.6300.
When testing the substitute alternative hypothesis, A, the proportion of debtors who
plan to pay 44% to 74% is not the same in Milwaukee and Kansas City, the chi-
squared test has a significance level of 0.7665.
4. H: The proportion of debtors who planned to pay 10% to 43% is the same
in Milwaukee and Kansas City.
A: The proportions are not the same.
Thechi-squared test gives a significance level equal to 0.3748. Pearson's correlation co-
efficient is 0.139.
107. Liquidating plans are excluded from the calculations of operating plans.
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TABLE 2
TYPES OF DEBTOR-PROPOSED PLANS
Kansas City Milwaukee
Liquidating Plans 6 (20%) 5 (23%)
100% 13 (43%) 5 (22%)
75% to 99% 1 (3%) 3 (14%)
44% to 74% 2 (7%) 1 (5%)
10% to 43% 8 (26%) 8 (36%)
30108 (99%) 22109 (100%)
Debtors in Milwaukee, like those in Kansas City, 110 who pro-
posed to pay 43% or less of the unsecured claims, had no
trouble receiving enough votes for confirmation of their plans
and did not appear to risk the loss of their ownership. Of the
eight plans proposing to pay 43% or less, the votes on four
confirmed plans ranged from 88% to 100%.111
Three of the four unconfirmed plans failed not as the re-
sult of unsecured creditor opposition, but rather as the result
of either the debtors' failure to propose a legally confirmable
plan or opposition by secured creditors. In Bernard Cos., 112
the debtor apparently filed the plan merely because it felt the
court required a plan. 113 The plan, on its face, could not have
fulfilled the requirements imposed by the Code,1 14 and the
108. There were actually 32 plans proposed, but it was impossible to determine the
payout under two of the plans. The 99% is a result of rounding off percentages.
109. There were 21 plans, but one case did not involve unsecured creditors.
110. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 268.
111. In Goelzer & Schultz Co., No. 82-01162 (E.D. Wis. filed Apr. 15, 1982),
100% of the voting unsecured creditors voted to accept the plan. In Metanoia Corp.,
No. 82-04341 (E.D. Wis. filed Dec. 3, 1982), 88% of the unsecured creditors voted to
accept the plan. The creditors who voted held 97% of the amount of the claims. In
Consolidated Aluminum Corp., No. 82-02183 (E.D. Wis. filed July 1, 1982), 89% of the
voting unsecured creditors holding 86% of the amounts of claims accepted. In Kohler
Corp., No. 82-02768 (E.D. Wis. filed Aug. 16, 1982), 90% of the unsecured creditors
accepted the plan. These creditors held 88% of the unsecured claims.
112. No. 82-03913 (E.D. Wis. filed Nov. 4, 1982).
113. Apparently, the debtor understood 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982), to require the
filing of a plan within 120 days after the date for the order of relief is granted. See infra
APPENDIX, Chart III. The only sanction for failing to file a plan within 120 days is that
other parties in interest may file a plan and the debtor loses the exclusive right to file a
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982).
114. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123 & 1129 (1982) set out the requirements for confirmation.
The plan could not have been confirmed because it did not designate classes or provide
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court never held a hearing to approve the disclosure
settlement.
The debtor in 4X Corp. I 5 filed its first plan without a dis-
closure statement. Four months later, the debtor filed an
amended plan and disclosure statement although no hearing
was ever held. Two large secured banks never agreed to their
treatment under the plan and applied to lift the stay immedi-
ately after the plan was filed. The unsecured creditors' com-
mittee did not object to either plan.
Kohler General Corp.1 16 was the only case with a con-
firmed plan in which the creditors' committee objected to the
disclosure statement or plan. The creditors' committee stated
that it had no input into the plan and that there was insuffi-
cient information to determine whether twenty cents on the
dollar was a reasonable figure. The amended disclosure state-
ment stated that the debtor was anxious to get out of Chapter
11 because buyers would not deal with it. Subsequently, the
debtor increased the payment to creditors to twenty-five cents
on the dollar. The creditors' committee recommended accept-
ance of the plan. The creditors holding unsecured claims
eventually accepted the plan by a vote of 88% of the amounts
and 90% of the claims.
Failure to receive confirmation in the Bernard Cos. and 4X
Corp. cases was due to secured creditors' opposition or the
failure of the debtor to propose a confirmable plan, but not to
unsecured creditor opposition. In Kohler, the unsecured cred-
itors successfully objected to the plan and only received a 5%
increase. From these findings it appears that debtors who pro-
posed confirmable plans acceptable to the secured creditors
had no difficulty persuading unsecured creditors to take less
than 43% of their claims.
The Kansas City study reasoned that the amounts offered
under the plan were "more a product of the debtors' goals in
the Chapter 11 proceedings than their ability to pay." '117 The
finding which supported this reasoning was that little relation-
for the treatment of taxes or administrative expenses. Also, no disclosure statement was
filed.
115. No. 82-04419 (E.D. Wis. filed Dec. 10, 1982).
116. No. 82-02768 (E.D. Wis. filed Aug. 16, 1982).
117. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 269.
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ship existed between the financial condition of the debtors and
the amounts they were obligated to pay creditors under con-
firmed plans. 118
The findings in Milwaukee were similar. For example,
Goelzer & Schultz Co.,119 involved a confirmation on a 40%
plan, even though according to the debtor's own figures it was
a solvent business.12 ° Of the five debtors proposing 100% to
unsecured creditors, the schedules filed by the debtors indi-
cated all were insolvent except one. 121 The findings in Mil-
waukee are consistent with the Kansas City conclusion. The
goals, 122 rather than the debtors' ability to pay, apparently de-
termined the amount paid to unsecured creditors. Addition-
ally, it appears that the prediction of the Kansas City study is
borne out. In Milwaukee, fewer debtors paid 100% than in
the earlier Kansas City study. 12 3
D. Length of the Proceeding
Although the Kansas City study did not specifically rely
upon the debtors' use of delays to support its conclusion, the
use of such tactics does support the results. As noted earlier,
creditors, when acting in their best interests, may want to de-
mand prompt payment in order to minimize their losses. 24
The debtors, on the other hand, receive the greatest benefit
from delaying payment to unsecured creditors for as long as
possible. In effect, the debtors receive an interest-free loan at
the expense of unsecured creditors.
The creditors' interest in prompt payment must be bal-
anced against the legitimate needs of the debtors to reorganize
118. Id. at 268.
119. No. 82-01162 (E.D. Wis. filed Apr. 19, 1982).
120. These figures come from the schedules filed by the debtor and may therefore
be inaccurate.
121. American Leisure Assocs., No. 82-00132 (E.D. Wis. filed Jan. 22, 1982). See
infra APPENDIX, Chart II.
122. Those goals for filing varied. The goals referred to here are either to minimize
payment or to pay in full for "pride, business reputation, or morality." LoPucki, supra
note 8, at 267-69.
123. The percentage was not found to be larger to a statistically significant degree.
See supra note 106.
124. See supra notes 48 & 49; see also LoPucki, supra note 8, at 269.
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while under the court's protection.'25 Congress felt 120 days
(four months) after the debtors' filing was sufficient to reor-
ganize the business in most cases.12 6 Congress recognized that
flexibility was needed to accommodate individual businesses,
and therefore allowed the court to lengthen or shorten the
debtors' exclusive period to file a plan for cause shown.2
The findings in Milwaukee indicate that the debtors stud-
ied were more successful in obtaining Chapter 11 delays than
either their Kansas City counterparts or the debtors studied
under the Act. Cases in Milwaukee generally took longer
than those cases. In Milwaukee, the average time between fil-
ing the petition and filing the plan was 193 days, 128 compared
to 127 days in Kansas City. 129 An average of twelve months
passed between filing a petition and confirmation of the plan
in Milwaukee.130  This compares to ten months in Kansas
City"3  and six months under the Act.' 32 Finally, it took an
average of twelve months to convert or dismiss a case in Mil-
waukee 133 as compared to six months in Kansas City. 34 This
meant that unsecured creditors could be forced to wait up to
two and one-half years1 35 before receiving any payments.
125. A plan must be "feasible" in order to be confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982).
A plan cannot be confirmed if afterwards the business is likely to be liquidated. 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1982).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2) (1982) provides that a debtor in most cases has an
exclusive right to file a plan for the first 120 days after the date of the order for relief.
This is extended to 180 days if a debtor has proposed a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(3)
(1982). "In most cases, 120 days will give the debtor adequate time to negotiate a settle-
ment, without unduly delaying creditors." H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
232 (1977).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1982).
128. See infra APPENDIX Chart III. The mean is 6.3 months. The standard devia-
tion is 3.629, and n=20 data points.
129. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 123. The Stanley & Girth study did not compute
the time between obtaining an order for relief in filing a plan.
130. See infra APPENDIX, Chart III. The mean is 12.25 months. The standard
deviation is 3.888, and n=12 data points.
131. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 123.
132. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 10, at 143.
133. See infra APPENDIX, Chart III. The mean is 11.97 months. The standard
deviation is 6.656, and n=31 data points.
134. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 123. There is no comparable data in the Stanley &
Girth study.
135. Six months will elapse from the time of default until suit is filed for trade debts
less than $10,000. See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 261-62. Another six months will typi-
cally be consumed if the debtor offers minimal resistance. Id. Then, on average, credi-
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Debtors may have learned in the two years since the Kan-
sas City study how to more effectively use the delays inherent
in the Chapter 11 proceedings. The unsecured creditors' al-
ternative to letting the business run its course while under the
protection of the Code in most cases studied was a liquidation,
yielding nothing to them. 136 In effect, the unsecured creditors
had no choice; they could either wait until the debtor decided
to propose a plan or move to convert and commit financial
suicide.
There are less cynical explanations for the lengthier pro-
ceedings in Milwaukee. The longer proceedings in Milwaukee
may simply reflect a difference in the districts. A number of
attorneys who represented debtors stated that in order to com-
ply with the feasibility requirement under the Code, 137 they
would not propose plans unless they were certain the debtor
would succeed. In addition, they considered the 120 day ex-
clusive period under the Code138 to be an insufficient time to
determine feasibility. The findings in the Kansas City and in
the Stanley & Girth study do not support this rationale. Both
studies had higher success rates of 28% to 33%139 and took
six to ten months to have the plans confirmed. The businesses
in those studies obtained a better success rate in less time.
E. Conclusion
The findings in Milwaukee support the conclusion that the
debtors retained control. Unsecured creditors generally could
not close businesses destined to fail even where they were
identified. The needed change of management rarely occurred.
Unsecured creditors could not effectively negotiate their treat-
ment under the proposed plans, and the debtors studied ap-
tors in Milwaukee must wait 12 months before a plan is confirmed. See infra
APPENDIX, Chart III. Two plans were confirmed 19 months after filing. Id.
136. This was revealed by the schedules and from the estate administrator's min-
utes of the § 341 meeting in which the debtor's attorney frequently made such a
statement.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1982) provides that the court shall only confirm a
plan if "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the
need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor
under the plan."
138. See infra note 184.
139. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 107-08.
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peared to use the delays more effectively in Chapter 11 than
their counterparts under the Act or in Kansas City.
III. REASONS FOR INADEQUATE CREDITOR CONTROL
A. Creditors' Committees Failed to Operate
Congress mandated that a creditors' committee be ap-
pointed in every case arising under Chapter 11140 and envi-
sioned that the committees would operate as the primary
negotiating bodies to formulate the plan. 14 1 Unsecured credi-
tors were to rely primarily on the committee to protect their
interests and control the debtor. 142 Congress broadened the
committee's powers to fulfill these functions by enabling it to
consult with the debtor, investigate, participate in the forma-
tion of the plan, and hire attorneys, accountants or other
agents. 14 3
The findings indicate that unsecured creditor participation
on the creditors' committee was far less than Congress had
envisioned in all districts. As Table 3 shows below, the com-
mittees were active 144 in only 16% to 38% of the cases,
although they were appointed in 49% to 85% of the cases.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1982) provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after the
order for relief under this chapter, the court shall appoint a committee of creditors
holding unsecured claims." Commentators interpret this to mean that a committee
must be appointed in every case. DeNatale, supra note 90, at 46; see Blaine & Erne,
supra note 90, at 492 n.6; Moller, supra note 4, at 458.
141. See H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 401 (1977).
142. The House Report states that the committee of creditors is "designed to deal
with the debtor in a more manageable way than the entire body of creditors could.
They are representative bodies that must speak for the groups of creditors with similar
interests." Id. at 235.
143. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1982).
144. See infra note 158.
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TABLE 3
APPOINTMENT AND ACTIVITY
COMMITTEES
OF CREDITORS'
Creditors'
Committees
Appointed
(Percent "Yes")
Median Number
of Days from
Filing to
Appointment of
Creditors'
Committee
Did Creditors'
Committees
Appoint Counsel
(Percent "Yes")
K.C. 145  Pilot 14
6
40% 65%
N/A
19%
19
38%
The appointment process apparently influenced the degree
of creditor involvement. The non-pilot districts of the trustee
study had the highest percentage of creditors' committees ap-
pointed. The high percentage in the non-pilot districts appar-
ently resulted from those districts following the statutory
mandate to automatically appoint 4 9 the seven largest credi-
tors. 150 In Kansas City, committees were first drafted in a
145. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 124-25.
146. N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, supra note 14, at 58.
147. Id.
148. See infra APPENDIX, Chart IV.
149. In eight of the nine pilot districts, appointment was handled by mail. The
clerk sent a letter notifying creditors of their appointment. Usually, creditors were re-
quired to accept in writing. In two districts, appointment was automatic and no re-
sponse was required. In one non-pilot district, creditors were assumed to have accepted
unless they responded to the contrary. N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, supra
note 14, at 52.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)(1982), provides: "As soon as practicable after the or-
der for relief under this chapter, the court shall appoint a committee of creditors hold-
ing unsecured claims."
11 U.S.C. § 1 102(b)(1) provides: "A committee of creditors appointed under sub-
section (a) of this section shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that
hold the seven largest claims against the debtor .... "
Non-
Pilot 14
7
85%
22
16%
Milw. 148
61%
30
27%
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manner similar to the non-pilot districts. This was discontin-
ued shortly after it began.'-"
Unlike the non-pilot districts or the Kansas City study, the
Milwaukee court appointed creditors to the committee after
the estate administrator 152 solicited their involvement and in-
formed them of the committee's role in the proceedings at an
informal meeting of large creditors. 153 The court did not ap-
point a committee if creditors were not interested.
The procedure in Milwaukee was similar to that followed
in the pilot districts. In four of the nine pilot districts, the
U.S. trustees1 54 solicited members of the creditors' committee
with letters and phone calls. 155 The U.S. trustees relied com-
pletely on telephone solicitation in four other districts. 156 The
U.S. trustees, in all but one of the pilot districts, appointed the
creditors' committee at a creditors' conference held before the
initial Section 341 meeting.1 57 As a result, creditors' commit-
tees were appointed in 65% of the cases in the pilot districts.
151. Interview with Lynn M. LoPucki, University of Wisconsin Professor (Spring,
1984).
152. Congress authorized the appointment of a deputy clerk-estate administrator
for each non-pilot bankruptcy court to begin on April 1, 1981. The duties of the estate
administrator regarding Chapter 11 cases are to develop and implement status reporting
activity, assist in organizing the creditors' committee, conduct the initial meeting of
creditors until a chairman is elected, advise the clerk of the bankruptcy court regarding
financial status and prospectus for reorganization, and monitor cases filed under Chap-
ter 11 to insure adequate progress. Nothing in the job description provides that the
estate administrator may file motions. Memorandum from Berkely Wright, Chief, Divi-
sion of Bankruptcy, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to the Clerks of
the Bankruptcy Court in Non-United States Trustee Pilot Districts (January 27, 1981).
153. The judges in Milwaukee initiated the informal meeting. Although not re-
quired by the Code, the judges sent a letter to the 20 largest unsecured creditors asking
them to attend the informal meeting. The estate administrator chaired the meeting of
the large unsecured creditors prior to the required initial meeting of creditors. At the
informal meeting the debtor made a brief statement, and after explaining the Chapter 11
proceedings and the role of the creditors' committee, the estate administrator solicited
creditors for the committee.
154. United States Trustees will be referred to as "U.S. trustee." The U.S. trustee
in pilot districts is responsible for the administration of the Chapter I 1 cases including
the solicitation of creditors' committees. "The main purpose of the U.S. Trustee [was]
to remove administrative duties from the bankruptcy judge, leaving the bankruptcy
judge free to resolve disputes untainted by knowledge of matters unnecessary to judicial
determination." 123 CONG. REc. 217 (Jan. 4, 1977) (statement of Hon. Donald Ed-
wards). See 11 U.S.C. § 151102(a) (1982).
155. N. AMEs, L. STELLNVAGON & R. JONES, supra note 14, at 52.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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All three studies used the committees' employment of
counsel as the test of whether the committee was active.
158
Creditors' committees were not always active. As Table 3 in-
dicates, the pilot districts had the greatest unsecured creditor
involvement, with attorneys for the committee appointed in
38% of the cases. The non-pilot districts with the highest in-
cidence of committees appointed had the lowest percentage of
attorneys; attorneys were appointed for the committees in
only 16% of the cases.
Unsecured creditor participation on the creditors' commit-
tee occurred most often in pilot districts. Milwaukee's simi-
larity in committee appointment with the pilot district,
resulted in similar percentages and the two highest rates of
involvement. Active involvement by either an estate adminis-
trator or U.S. trustee in soliciting committee members yielded
a 40% to 137% increase 159 in involvement over the non-pilot
districts, which merely appointed the seven largest unsecured
creditors. Without the solicitation of an estate administrator
or U.S. trustee, unsecured creditors were not active in 81% to
84% the cases.16° The higher involvement in the pilot dis-
tricts and Milwaukee suggests that committees only become
organized when someone initiates the process.
Initiation of the committee process appears to be more im-
portant than financial incentives in obtaining an active com-
mittee. Generally, it is assumed that if financial incentives do
not exist, creditors will not become involved. Not surpris-
ingly, creditors in Milwaukee were active in few cases, and
those cases in which they were active involved most of the
assets. 161 A correlation appears 162 to have existed in Milwau-
158. In Milwaukee, the creditors' committees without counsel did not participate
to any noticeable extent. This was also found to be the case in the U.S. trustee study
and Kansas City study. N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, supra note 14, at 56;
see LoPucki, supra note 8, at 253.
159. A comparison between Milwaukee and Kansas City yields a 40% increase,
and a comparison between the pilot and non-pilot district yields a 137% increase.
160. An estate administrator or trustee was not involved in Kansas City. Credi-
tors' committees were active in only 19% of the cases.
161. The assets in Milwaukee totalled $82,255,807. Creditors' committees hired
attorneys in thirteen cases with debtor scheduled assets of $54,363,195, or 66% of the
total assets scheduled. See infra APPENDIX, Charts II & IV. This percentage would
decrease to 43% if 4X Corp., representing approximately one-third of the total assets
scheduled, was excluded. 4X Corp. had scheduled assets of $33,100,423. Id. at Chart
II.
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kee between unsecured creditor involvement and the amount
of the assets in the case. This finding differs from Kansas
City. In Kansas City, creditors' committees retained attor-
neys in cases representing only 17% of the assets scheduled. 163
It seems unlikely that unsecured creditors in Kansas City
were less motivated by financial incentives than their Milwau-
kee counterparts. Rather, Kansas City creditors lacked either
an estate administrator or U.S. trustee to initiate the process.
Even when someone initiated the committee process, un-
secured creditors failed to participate on committees in at
least 62% of the cases studied. The Kansas City study opined
that "bankruptcy legislation had failed.., to make [creditor]
participation profitable"'164 and was inherently flawed. 165
The failure of creditors' committees to function under-
mines the Code's scheme to monitor the debtor or insure a
meaningful reorganization. The incentives 166 of the debtor to
remain in Chapter 11 were not countered. Debtors in non-
pilot districts continued to operate, almost uncontrolled, as
long as they met current operating expenses. If committee so-
licitation failed in the pilot districts, the U.S. trustee provided
the needed control.
162. This was not confirmed to a statistically significant level. The Wilcoxon
Rank-Sum test was used to determine whether firms with unsecured creditor involve-
ment are larger or smaller than those without unsecured creditor involvement. The
following null hypothesis was accepted and the alternative hypothesis rejected:
H: All debtors with involvement of unsecured creditors have the same total
assets scheduled.
A: The debtors with involvement of unsecured creditors tend to have different
amounts of assets than those without unsecured creditor involvement.
The null hypothesis was accepted at a significance level of 0.1019.
163. In Kansas City, there were assets totaling $51,274,849. Attorneys represented
creditors' committees in cases involving $8,565,353 worth of assets. See LoPucki, supra
note 8, at 120-21, 124-25.
164. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 248.
165. That study cited creditors' lack of financial incentives to participate on the
committee, the lack of qualifications of committee members to aid in reorganization, the
inherent weakness of the committee forum to perform its function of investigating, and
the distance between the court, debtor and members of the committee as reasons for
committee ineffectiveness.
166. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 114-17.
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B. Secured Creditors Protected Their Own
Interests Exclusively
The protection of secured creditors' rights were generally
not considered in any of the studies. They could protect their
interests by moving 167 to lift the automatic stay and receiving
adequate protection 168 from the debtor. If the debtor failed to
provide adequate protection, the court lifted the stay and the
secured creditor proceeded to foreclose under state law.
C. Opposition: Not Necessarily Keeping the Debtor
Under Control
The Code provides creditors with the means to close non-
viable businesses and to remove poor management. 169 The
Kansas City study found that these means were not necessar-
ily used to close nonviable debtors or remove poor manage-
ment. It found that opposition flourished in the wrong cases,
large cases destined for success,17 ° and that the means were
more likely used to strike a better bargain or possibly to in-
crease the fees of the attorney for the committee. 171 Opposi-
tion was defined in the Kansas City study as "actions taken of
record in the case which had either as their ostensible purpose
or their natural consequence the closing of the business."' 72
167. In 1982, a request for relief from the stay was an adversary proceeding. In
1983, relief from the stay was treated as a motion and will hereinafter be referred to as
such. See BANKRUPTCY RULE 4001.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1982) provides for relief from the stay for "lack of ade-
quate protection of an interest in property"; 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1982), provides that
the court on request of a party interested shall condition the use, sale or lease of prop-
erty as is needed to provide adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1982), provides
that senior or equal liens may be given to secure new credit only if existing secured
creditors receive adequate protection of their interests. See James & Kirkland, Ade-
quate Protection Through Augmented Interests in Reorganization Plans, 58 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 69, 77-78 (1984); see also Axe, Penetrating the Iron Curtain: Representing Secured
Creditors in Chapter 11 Reorganization Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 421, 427-39
(1984).
169. These means include motions to employ a trustee or examiner, to convert the
case to Chapter 7 or dismiss it, to prohibit the use of cash collateral or prohibit the use
or sale of other collateral, to shorten the time for filing a plan of reorganization, to
require the debtor to indemnify the estate, to file a liquidating plan of reorganization,
and to oppose borrowing by the debtor. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 111.
170. Id. at 110.
171. Id. at 112.
172. Id. at 110.
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The Kansas City study classified opposition as either
"strong," "mild," or "none. '1 73
TABLE 4
OPPOSITION/SUCCESS CORRELATION
Kansas City174 Milwaukee 175
Strong Opposition
Compared to Successes 5/11 (45%) 2/12 (17%)
Creditor Motions to
Convert Compared to
Successes 6/11 (55%) 1/12 (8%)
Creditor Motions to
Convert Compared to
Failures 7/30 (23%) 8/33 (24%)
Table 4 indicates that the high correlation between suc-
cessful cases and strong opposition or motions to convert in
the Kansas City study were not found in Milwaukee. 176 Cred-
itors mounted strong opposition in only two (17%) of the suc-
173. "'Strong' opposition typically would continue during the entire pendency of
the case; 'mild' opposition typically was sporadic, and led to some accommodation be-
tween the debtor and the opposing creditor." Id. at 111.
174. See id. at 111, 120-21.
175. See infra APPENDIX, Chart III. Cases with little opportunity for opposition
were omitted in the comparison between motions to convert and failures. See LoPucki,
supra note 8, at 111 n.56. This included one case.
176. The correlation between motions to convert and successful cases in Milwaukee
and Kansas City was different to a statistically significant degree. The number of mo-
tions to convert in successful cases in Kansas City was found to be larger than the
number of motions to convert in successful cases in Milwaukee to a statistically signifi-
cant degree. Two tests were conducted on the following null hypothesis:
H: The number of motions to convert in successful cases are the same in Mil-
waukee and Kansas City.
The following alternative hypothesis was tested using the chi-squared test of
homogeneity:
A: The proportion of motions to convert in successful cases in Kansas City is
different than the proportion of motions to convert in successful cases in
Milwaukee.
The chi-squared test of homogeneity resulted in a significance level of 0.0161, meaning
the alternative hypothesis was accepted.
The Fisher-Irwin test was used to test the following alternative hypothesis:
A: The proportion of motions to convert in successful cases in Kansas City is
greater than the proportion in Milwaukee.
The level of significance using the Fisher-Irwin test was found to be 0.0239, meaning the
alternative hypothesis was accepted.
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cessful cases in Milwaukee as compared to five (45%) in
Kansas City. 177 Creditors in Milwaukee moved to convert in
only one (8%) successful case. In contrast, over half (55%) of
the successful cases in Kansas City had motions to convert
brought by creditors.
Milwaukee attorneys may not have been motivated to use
opposition to strike a better bargain or mount fees of attorneys
for the creditors' committee. Attorneys, with three more
years of experience with the Code, may have been better able
to identify cases destined to fail and limit their opposition to
those cases.
Creditors did not, however, move to convert cases in
which they probably would not be paid. In both Milwaukee
and Kansas City, creditors' motions to convert were not
brought in most cases destined to fail. This is not surprising
since unsecured creditors usually receive nothing in the event
of liquidation under Chapter 7.178
177. This difference could not be confirmed to a statistically significant level. There
is not enough evidence to reject the hypothesis that the proportion of successful cases
with strong opposition is the same in Kansas City and Milwaukee. Two separate tests
were conducted and both yielded the above conclusion.
First the chi-squared test of homogeneity was performed on the following alterna-
tive hypothesis:
A: The proportion of successful cases with strong opposition is not the same in
Milwaukee as in Kansas City.
The chi-squared test of homogeneity resulted in a significance level of 0.3400, mean-
ing the alternative hypothesis could not be accepted.
When testing the data using the Fisher-Irwin test, the following alternative hypothe-
sis was compared against the null hypothesis:
A: The proportion of successful cases with strong opposition in Milwaukee is
less than the proportion in Kansas City.
The significance probability was 0.1483, meaning the alternative hypothesis could
not be accepted.
178. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 5
OPPoSITION/SIZE/SUCCESS CORRELATION
Kansas City179  Milwaukee 80
Strong Opposition
Compared to Large
Asset Cases* 14/22 (64%) 9/23 (39%)
Strong Opposition
Compared to Small
Asset Cases* 2/22 (9%) 4/24 (17%)
Success Compared
to Large Asset
Cases* 9/22 (41%) 8/23 (35%)
Success Compared
to Small Asset
Case* 2/22 (9%) 4/24 (17%)
* The cases in Chart 2 of the Appendix were divided in half.
Those in the upper half are large asset cases; those in the lower half
are small asset cases.
As Table 5 illustrates, creditors in Kansas City and Mil-
waukee brought strong opposition where financial incentives
to liquidate most likely existed. Strong opposition in Milwau-
kee occurred twice as often in large asset cases as in small
asset cases. Strong opposition in Kansas City occurred seven
times as often in large asset cases as in small asset cases. The
correlation between size and strong opposition was found to
be statistically significant.181 Small asset cases which had the
lowest success rate also had the lowest rate of opposition.
It appears that strong opposition correlates with size and
not success.18 2 The correlation between success and opposi-
179. Four cases were excluded because there was little opportunity for opposition.
See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 111 n.56.
180. See infra APPENDIX, Chart II.
181. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was performed to determine whether debtors
with strong opposition were larger than those without strong opposition. The following
alternative hypothesis was accepted over the null hypothesis with a level of significance
equal to 0.0399:
H: All debtors have equal total assets regardless of the degree of opposition.
A: Debtors with strong opposition had a larger amount of scheduled assets.
182. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was performed to determine whether successful
debtors were larger than those who failed. The following null hypothesis was accepted
with a level of significance equal to 0.1123:
H: All debtors have equal total assets regardless of their success.
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tion, found in successful Kansas City cases, tended to be
large.183 Creditors did not have economic incentives to close
small asset nonviable businesses but only to mount opposition
in large asset cases.
D. Non-Debtor Proposed Plans Provided
No Realistic Control
Congress generally limited the debtor's exclusive right to
file a plan of reorganization to 120 days.'84 This constraint
was imposed in order to bring pressure upon the debtor to
negotiate terms and work out a reorganization within a rea-
sonable period of time.'85
The Kansas City study found that the average time be-
tween filing the plan and the petition was 127 days. 86 The
debtors in Kansas City apparently perceived the loss of this
exclusiveness as a threat, as did many debtors in Milwaukee.
Of the nineteen initial plans filed in Milwaukee, eight (42%)
were filed roughly18 7 within the 120 day period. If plans were
filed later than 120 days, debtors usually requested extensions
of the 120 day period which were readily granted by the
court. 188
Little evidence existed that the loss of the exclusive period
posed any threat. In the Eastern District of Wisconsin only
one non-debtor proposed plan of liquidation was filed.'8 9 No
disclosure statement was fied in that case and the court never
considered the plan. Two non-debtor plans were filed in Kan-
A: Successful debtors are larger.
183. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 108-09.
184. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982) provides that only the debtor may file a plan dur-
ing the 120 days after the date of the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1982),
provides that the court may reduce or increase the 120-day period for cause.
185. Congress felt a reasonable period was 120 days: "In most cases, 120 days will
give the debtor adequate time to negotiate a settlement, without unduly delaying credi-
tors." H.R. REP. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 232 (1977).
186. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 123.
187. See infra APPENDIX, Chart III. The mean was 192.95 days. The standard
deviation was 110.90 days, and n=20 data points. Id. The 120 day period is estimated
from the months.
188. While the court did not always grant an extension for the length of time re-
quested, it never denied an extension in cases studied.
189. Conservation Update Publications, Inc., No. 82-03509 (E.D. Wis. filed Oct.
10, 1982).
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sas City, neither of which was ever considered for
confirmation. 190
The Kansas City study concluded that it was unrealistic to
believe that creditors would propose operating plans' 91 since
creditors usually lacked information and the businesses gener-
ally could not survive without the involvement of the owner-
manager. 19 The findings in Milwaukee support these ratio-
nales. Creditors received detailed information from a court
appointed examiner in only one case 193 and then promptly im-
posed a trustee. All the businesses studied in Milwaukee were
closely held, 194 and many could not have operated without the
principal owner.
E. Trustees and Examiners Were Seldom Used to
Investigate Desirability of Continuing Business
Upon a motion of a party in interest, the court may ap-
point an examiner or trustee to investigate allegations of
fraud, dishonesty, gross mismanagement, the financial condi-
tion of the debtor, the operation of the debtor, the desirability
of the continuance of the business and any other matter rele-
vant to the case or formation of a plan. 95
The Kansas City study found that most businesses entered
Chapter 11 to avoid imminent liquidation and then failed
within six months after filing.196 The findings in Milwaukee
were similar. Of the forty-four cases in Milwaukee where the
precipitating factor for filing was known, twenty-seven (61%)
were the result of direct creditor pressure which could have
closed the business within two weeks.
The Kansas City study reasoned that this should have
prompted either the creditors' committee or the court to put a
stop to these businesses, and that the most likely way to inves-
tigate the desirability of continuance would have been the em-
190. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 254.
191. Id. at 253-57.
192. Id. at 256.
193. See infra APPENDIX, Chart IV.
194. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
195. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) & (b) (1982). See generally Berdan & Arnold, Dis-
placing the Debtor in Possession: The Requisites for and Advantages of the Appointment
of a Trustee in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 458 (1984).
196. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 123, 258-59.
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ployment of a trustee or examiner. 197 However, the Kansas
City study found that this was done in only three (6%)
cases. 198
TABLE 6
APPOINTMENT OF EXAMINERS AND TRUSTEES
Non-
K.C. 199  Milw. 200  Pilot201  Pilot202
Appointment of
Examiner 6% 2% N/A N/A
Appointment of
Trustee 10% 10% N/A N/A
Motion and sua
sponte Order
for Examiner N/A 2% 5% 7%
Motion and sua
sponte Order
for Trustee N/A 10% 17% 40%
The court rarely appointed a trustee or examiner to inves-
tigate the desirability of continuing the business in any of the
districts studied. As Table 6 indicates above, the appointment
of trustees and examiners 2° 3 was fairly uniform throughout
the districts studied except for appointments of trustees in the
pilot districts.2°
Even when examiners and trustees were appointed, the
findings in Milwaukee and Kansas City indicate that they did
not necessarily investigate the desirability of continuing the
197. Id. at 259.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 124-25.
200. See infra APPENDIX, Chart IV.
201. N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, supra note 14, at 74-75.
202. Id.
203. The slightly higher figures in Table 6 in the non-pilot and pilot districts can be
accounted for because they included motions which may not have been granted. Id. at
73.
204. The higher percentages of trustees appointed or moved for in pilot and non-
pilot districts are misleading because the trustees were frequently appointed for an or-
derly liquidation rather than to run the business or investigate the desirability of contin-
uing the business. The trustee study does not give enough information to draw any
conclusions regarding the high percentage of trustee appointments for the pilot districts.
Id.
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business. The courts in Milwaukee appointed a trustee in one
case to determine the desirability of continuing the business. 20 5
In two cases,20 6 the trustee took over the business for the pur-
pose of preserving the assets for an orderly liquidation, and in
one case, 20 7 the trustee found tenants to rent the debtor's
property. An examiner was employed in one case20 s to inves-
tigate fraud rather than determine the viability of the business.
In the Kansas City study, examiners were appointed in three
cases to determine the desirability of continuing the business.
A trustee was never appointed for such a purpose in Kansas
City.20 9
These findings are somewhat troubling. Congress and
commentators believed that one of the first tasks of the credi-
tors' committee would be to determine whether the present
management of the debtor should be retained.2 10 If there is
any money available, the appointment of an examiner is the
most convenient way for creditors to determine the viability of
the business. The examiner can provide an objective view-
point of the business based on knowledge gained from exami-
nation of the debtor and the debtor's business records. The
information would not be a direct cost to the individual credi-
tor because the examiner's fees would be paid by the estate.211
Creditors may be foregoing the use of these tools to keep
down administrative expenses of the estate, or the estate might
not be able to financially support an examiner. Another ex-
planation is ignorance. Creditors and their attorneys perhaps
believe that trustees or examiners should only be used when
there exists gross mismanagement or blatant fraud. Only re-
cently has the appointment of an examiner emerged as a po-
tentially useful remedy in pilot districts.212 Rather than
205. 4X Corp., No. 82-04419 (E.D. Wis. filed Dec. 12, 1982).
206. A.W. Huss Co., No. 82-00097 (E.D. Wis. filed Jan. 18, 1982); Plunkett, 0. &
M., No. 82-01119 (E.D. Wis. filed Apr. 15, 1982).
207. Pavek Bros. Farms, No. 82-02694 (E.D. Wis. filed Aug. 9, 1982).
208. A. W. Huss, No. 82-00097.
209. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 259.
210. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977); J. TROST, A. TREISrER,
L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, supra note 25, at 261-62.
211. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1982) allows fees of an examiner to be paid by the court
upon approval of the court.
212. N. AMES, L. STELLWAGON & R. JONES, supra note 14, at 76. The examiner
in the pilot districts usually answers the following questions: Is the debtor's business
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
limiting the appointment of an examiner to cases where fraud
is suspected, some pilot districts are appointing examiners as
fact-finders in cases where the debtor is barely solvent and not
moving toward proposing a plan.21 3 The U.S. trustee, or any
party in interest, can then use the examiner's report to support
motions before the court. 214
Creditors without the appointment of an examiner or
trustee did not investigate whether the business should con-
tinue. Consequently, the decision of whether the business
should continue to operate was left solely to the debtor and
the major secured creditor.
F. Preferences Were Not Attacked
The ability to recover preferential transfers215 insures that
debtors do not prefer any creditor over another in the period
immediately before bankruptcy. The 1978 Code made the re-
covery of preferences much simpler than it had been under the
Act. The Code presumes insolvency during the ninety day pe-
riod preceding the filing of a petition and eliminates the rea-
sonable cause requirement.21 6
There was little evidence in the cases studied that prefer-
ences were widely attacked. Evidence existed in two of the
cases21 7 studied in Milwaukee that preferences were attacked.
It is difficult to determine whether these preferences were
made and it may be that preferences were not given in any of
the other cases. Since most of the debtors studied were unso-
viable? Will it be able to move toward a plan? Will it be able to achieve breakeven?
Does it have a viable market share? Is its pricing competitive?
In other words, the examiner is asked to do a complete analysis of the business as a
going concern and to return with recommendations for action (e.g., conversion if no
reorganization seems likely). Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. A preference is defined as a transfer or payment which is given within 90 days,
or one year if to an insider, before filing the petition enabling a creditor to receive more
than it would receive under Chapter 7 or if the transfer had not been made. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b) (1982).
216. See J. TROST, A. TREISTER, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, supra note
25, at 155-56. Under the Act the party attacking the preference had to prove that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of payment and that the creditor had reasonable cause
to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of transfer.
217. Doelger & Kirston, Inc., No. 82-01836 (E.D. Wis. filed June 4, 1982);
Plunkett, 0. & M., No. 82-01119 (E.D. Wis. filed Apr. 15, 1982).
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phisticated "mom and pop" businesses and had little choice of
when to file,218 it seems reasonable that some debtors would
have preferred creditors.
Creditors' committees with attorneys occurred in only
16% to 38% of the cases, and therefore there was no one to
pursue preferences if they were given. Attacking the prefer-
ences may have gone against the interests of the individual
creditors on the committee who themselves received prefer-
ences. Committee members may have felt that attacking a
payment on a debt due a fellow creditor was unfair.
However, if preferences were given in the small cases and
were not recovered, one more control was removed. The
debtor may be less likely to effectuate an early plan because
creditors of concern to them will have been paid.
IV. ELIMINATING DEBTOR CONTROL
A. Greater Use of Examiners and Trustees to Investigate
Unsecured creditors could many times maximize their re-
turn only in cases involving nonviable businesses by either
ousting the debtor-in-possession to change management, or by
immediately selling the business to a willing purchaser before
the debtor did any further damage. Both alternatives required
creditors to have detailed information about the business'
operations.
One method by which creditors could have obtained de-
tailed information was through the appointment of a trustee
or examiner for investigative purposes. All the studies found
a relatively infrequent use of trustees or examiners. Either the
courts or the creditors did not recognize that the discovery of
information was necessary to bankruptcy cases. The U.S.
Trustee study noted that the pilot districts used examiners in
increasing numbers as fact-finders in marginal cases. Other
districts should follow this lead to obtain information when-
ever possible. Creditors will then place themselves in a better
position to determine the viability of the business and its man-
agement, persuade a buyer to purchase the business, or sup-
port future motions.
218. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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B. Amend Chapter 13
One solution to debtor control might be to modify Chapter
13 to include corporations and all businesses which meet the
debt requirements.' 19 Chapter 13 does not contemplate un-
secured creditor involvement, 220 but calls for a plan to be filed
with the petition 221 so that creditors can begin receiving pay-
ments shortly after filing. Since this study found that small
asset cases usually did not have unsecured creditor involve-
ment, those cases would then be monitored by the Chapter 13
trustee.
This change is not a complete solution since large asset
cases in which the assets were fully encumbered likewise did
not have unsecured creditor involvement. These cases would
again "slip through the cracks." Amending Chapter 13 would
only be a temporary solution if the U.S. trustee system is not
adopted. Additionally, amending Chapter 13 may resurrect
the problems corrected by merging Chapter 11 with Chapter
X2 2 2and consequently be a step backwards.
C. Adopt U.S. Trustee System
The solution to many of the problems discussed would be
to adopt the U.S. trustee system or some similar administra-
tive arm of the bankruptcy court which had been recom-
mended prior to the approval of the Code.2 3 Unregulated
debtor control occurred in cases the creditors did not actively
monitor. The U.S. trustee can encourage creditors to be ac-
tive and, if this fails, step into the creditors' role to monitor
the debtor.
The findings support the adoption of the U.S. trustee sys-
tem. The pilot districts had the greatest creditor involvement.
Involvement by a U.S. trustee yielded up to a 137% increase
in involvement of unsecured creditors over non-pilot dis-
219. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982) requires unsecured debts to be under $100,000 and
secured debts to be less than $350,000.
220. A standing trustee is appointed for all cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
221. See BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015.
222. One of the reasons for consolidating Chapter X in Chapter XI of the Act was
to dispose of "the costly and uncertain litigation needed to determine whether the case
should proceed under Chapter X or XI." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 223
(1977).
223. Kennedy, supra note 28, at 63-64.
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tricts.224 Even the involvement of an estateadministrator,
with fewer statutory powers than a U.S.trustee, yielded at
least a 40% increase in the creditor involvement over other
non-pilot districts.
Lack of financial incentives has meant that creditors in
many cases, and particularly in low asset cases, failed to
mount opposition to debtors or bring motions to convert
where the business was destined to fail. This study concluded
that bringing a motion to convert usually meant financial sui-
cide for creditors. 225 Likewise, the expense to creditors and
the estate of bringing a motion to oppose the debtor may have
kept creditors from opposing the debtor.
U.S. trustees are better able to bring motions which have
the effect of closing a business when creditors exhibit no inter-
est in the case and the business is nonviable. A concern may
exist that the U.S. trustee may move to convert or oppose via-
ble businesses. However, creditors can oppose such motions
when not in their best interests.226
Probably the greatest obstacle confronting the adoption of
the U.S. trustee system is the belief that an administrative gov-
ernment agency should not play a paternal role in cases in
which creditors have no interest. In most cases filed, creditors
did not have sufficient economic incentives under the present
law to control the debtor. Rather, the bankruptcy law en-
courages debtors to enter bankruptcy and operate in it as long
as possible.227 Unless the Code were to provide, as do anti-
trust laws, 228 economic incentives to creditors to pursue abu-
sive or non-reorganizing debtors, then it seems the imbalance
of the Code should be countered by the involvement of a U.S.
trustee.
The involvement of the U.S. trustee could help correct the
fundamental flaw in the Chapter 11 concept identified by the
Kansas City study. While Chapter 11 was designed only to
serve the debtor who sought meaningful reorganization, no
provisions were made for the debtor who filed to delay credi-
224. See supra note 159.
225. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
226. This is unlikely to happen because creditors are not involved in these cases.
227. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
228. Antitrust legislation allows injured parties to collect three times their actual
damages plus the cost of suit and reasonable attorneys fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
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tors and reduce debt with no intention of risking a change in
management. 2 9 This study confirms that most debtors en-
tered Chapter 11 to avoid an imminent closing of the business
with little likelihood of reorganization. Chapter 11 enabled
those businesses to continue operating, thereby depleting as-
sets through salaries and other administrative expenses, with
little possibility of reorganization. The implementation of the
U.S. trustee system is one tried and proven solution to correct
the problem of the debtor in full control.
POSTSCRIPT
After this article was completed, Congress adopted the
U.S. trustee system as the solution to debtor control.2 30 The
U.S. trustee system is a new concept for non-pilot districts,
including both the Eastern and Western Districts of Wiscon-
sin.2 3 1 This article suggested that the U.S. trustee system,
which has now been adopted, was much needed. More impor-
tantly, however, the author hopes this article will aid practi-
tioners in obtaining an overview of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
practice, enabling them to utilize the mechanisms available to
creditors under the Code, which will remain in effect after the
U.S. trustee system is fully implemented.
229. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 273.
230. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. - (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
231. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 581(a) (1982) with Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 111, 100
Stat. - (amending 28 U.S.C. § 581(a)).
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